Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1958

Arthur O. Naujoks and Gertraude Naujoks v. Emil
Suhrmann et al : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Naujoks v. Suhrmann, No. 8775 (Utah Supreme Court, 1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2991

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
.ARTHUR 0. NAUJOKS and
GERTRAUDE NAUJOKS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
EMIL SUHRMANN, dba SUHRMANN'S SOUTH TEMPLE MEAT
COMPANY and ALBERT NOORDA
and SAM L. GUSS, dba JORDAN
MEAT & LIVESTOCK COMPANY
and VALLEY SAUSAGE COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 8775

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the
record. The Appellants will be referred to as the Defendants.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In making the Statement of :B-,acts defendants do
not recognize the rule that in view of the verdict and
judgment for plaintiffs the evidence must be viewed
most favorably for plaintiffs. They leave out much of the
evidence that is important.
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For example, they failed to disclose to the Court the
fact that the partners of the Jordan Meat & Livestock
Company are the sole owners of the stock of the Valley
Sausage Company. These two concerns are really one.
The Jordan Meat buys the meat products and sells
these meat products to retail outlets. Valley Sausage
Company was formed to carry on the sausage business
of the Jordan Meat. The raw materials necessary for
making sausage are "sold" by Jordan Meat to Valley
Sausage and then Valley Sausage "sells" the product
to Jordan Meat, which in turn sells to the retail outlets.
In another instance the defendants show the conflict
in testimony relating to whether or not Hoffman assisted
and instructed the Suhrmanns in the smoking of mettwurst. The jury found against defendants (Interrogatory 4, R. 176) and this Court should, under the law,
consider the conflict in favor of plaintiffs here. This
would mean that for purposes of appeal it is an established fact that Hoffman did assist and instruct the
Suhrmanns in the smoking of the mettwurst.
Under the facts as found by the jury, Emil Suhrmann purchased mettwurst in an unprocessed state (that
is, not treated for the purpose of killing trichina) from
the Jordan ~feat & Livestock Company, which company
had in turn obtained it from the Valley Sausage Company, the manufacturer which in turn had obtained it
from Jordan Meat. Alfred Hoffman advised and assisted
Emil Suhrmann in smoking the mettwurst and in doing
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so he was acting as the agent of the Jordan Meat and
the Valley Sausage Company. At the time the Jordan
Meat sold the raw mettwurst sausage to Suhrmann, it
actually knew and as a reasonably prudent person should
have known, that Suhrmann intended to sell the mettwurst to the public without processing it so as to kill
trichina. At the time Valley Sausage Company manufactured and delivered the raw mettwurst to Jordan
Meat it actually knew as a reasonably prudent person
should have known, that the mettwurst would be
sold and delivered by Jordan Meat to Suhrmann and
Suhrmann would sell it to the public without processing
it to kill trichina. The plaintiffs ate mettwurst infested
with trichina purchased from Suhrmann which, in turn,
had been manufactured by Valley Sausage and sold to
Suhrmann by Jordan Meat. As a result of eating this
mettwurst plaintiffs contracted trichinosis.
The foregoing statement of facts is taken directly
from the special verdict returned by the jury (175-178).
The foregoing are the ultimate facts established under
the evidence and found by the jury and upon which
plaintiff is entitled to recover in this cause. The detailed
testimony introduced supports all of these findings.
We will refer to the details of the testimony as it becomes applicable in answering the arguments of defendants.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S ANSWERS
TO QUESTIONS 5 AND 6 OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT.
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POINT II.
A SPECIAL VERDICT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO GIVE THE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS OF EITHER PLAINTIFFS OR DEFENDANTS.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
POINT IV.
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE CROSS-COMPLAINT OF SUHRMANN AND SUBMITTING THE ISSUES THEREIN TO THE JURY IN NO
WAY A F F E C T S THE JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFFS
AGAINST DEFENDANTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S ANSWERS
TO QUESTIONS 5 AND 6 OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT.

This point, as argued in defendants' Brief, really
contains two distinct and separate propositions. In order
to treat the matter in an orderly fashion we are setting
forth these two propositions under this point.
Defendants here contend that there is no evidence
to sustain a finding that Hoffman was the agent of the
defendants. The next separate and distinct proposition
is that there is no evidence to support a finding that
defendants knew, or as reasonably prudent persons,
should have lmown, that Suhnnann intended to sell the
mettwurst to the public without processing it to kill
trichina.
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The jury made these findings which are in favor of
plaintiff's position. Hence, the evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to plaintiffs in determining whether these findings are supported. All
conflicts in testimony must be resolved on appeal in
favor of the jury finding and the Court must draw all
reasonable inferences from the facts which tend to support these findings. The defendants, in their brief, have
totally ignored this very fundamental rule which governs
an appeal from a judgment rendered in an action at
law.
1.

Hoffman an agent of defendants.

As heretofore pointed out, the Jordan Meat & Livestock Company and the Valley Sausage Company are
integral parts of one business operation which has for
its purpose selling meat and meat products to retail
outlets. No money changes hands between these companies, but merely bookkeeping entries. Both companies
are owned lock, stock and barrel by the same individuals.
(246-249). Alfred Hoffman was normally employed by
the Valley Sausage Company as a sausage maker (463,
490). Because of language difficulties, when Suhrmann
would call to place orders he was referred to Hoffman.
(494). Practically all of the business dealings regarding
the sale and purchase of meat between Suhrmann and
defendants was conducted through Hoffman (306, 494).
In spite of the denial by N oorda that Hoffman had
anything to do with selling ( 463) he admitted he knew
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that Hoffman had a conversation with Suhrmann and
Hoffman asked N oorda if "we would take and make the
sausage, blood sausage, liverwurst and mettwurst for
Suhrmann" ( 464). N oorda replied that "we would make
it for anyone." (464). Thus we have a situation where
the first contact in connection with the sale of meat
to Suhrmann was had through Hoffman and this was
brought to the attention of the defendant N oorda.
This, together with the fact that Noorda knew Hoffman was taking orders for meat products from Suhrmann, establishes that he knew Hoffman was actively
engaged in selling and N oorda, by not stopping him,
approved of such activity. This attitude on Noorda's
part makes common sense. The ultimate object of Valley
Sausage and Jordan Meat was to sell their products
and anyone in the organization would certainly be expected to assist in achieving that objective just as Hoffman did. The end of April or first part of ~Iay, 1955,
Suhrmann was informed by Hoffman that defendants
were not going to deliver mettwurst any longer (306).
Suhrmann then went to the defendants' plant and there
saw both Hoffman and Noorda. Hoffman, in the presence of N oorda, stated that he would be unable to deliver
mettwurst because all the ovens were used for hot cooking and they had no facility for cold sn1oking the products (307). Suhrmann testified that at this meeting
(307):
"A.

I make then the suggestion to :Mr. Hoffman
and told him I had an oven which I could
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use and maybe we could do the cold smoking
in my store.

Q. And then what was
A.

It seems to me that Mr. Hoffman didn't like
the idea.

Q. Well, what did he
A.

said~

say~

I can't remember the words only that I had
the impression he would not accept my proposition.

Q. Was anything else said in the
A.

Well, Mr. Noorda told me "We will do anyway."

Q. And then was anything else
A.

conversation~

said~

We agreed finally that the company should
bring the raw wurst, ready to be smoked, to
my place and we should do the cold smoking."

From this we see that Mr. Hoffman took an active
part in the conversation and was not merely a conduit
of German. Hoffman even made the arrangements with
Suhrmann for giving credit for shrinkage of the mettwurst in processing it (313). Noorda was aware of this
arrangement for shrinkage because he testified that
that was one of the conditions under which Suhrmann
was to smoke the mettwurst ( 465, 492). Suhrmann had
had no experience in smoking mettwurst and he talked
with Hoffman about how it should be done (307). Suhrmann testified as followE: (308):

"Q. Do you recall whether or not Mr. N oorda
was present~
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A.

It is possible, but I am not quite sure about it.

Q. Do you remember then anyone other than
Mr. Hoffman and yourself being present~
A.

Mr. N oorda would be the only person being
present.

Q.

Now tell us what was

A.

I inquired what is this cold and hot smoking,
what it really was, and he instructed me on it
and told me how to proceed.

Q. And what did he
A.

said~

say~

He told me as soon as the wurst is in the
oven the temperature must not. be above 80
degrees.

Q. Was anything else said about how to do
A.

it~

When I talked to him he said a few degrees
more, maybe five, or even ten would be the
limit, and if it would go higher, about 90
that would spoil it and ruin the wurst."

On May 19, 1955, the first mettwurst was delivered
to Suhrmann under this new arrangement (311, Exhibit
P-1).
Hoffman himself delivered the ~Iettwurst to Suhrmann on May 19th. Suhrmann testified (318, 319) :
"Q.

Now on tllis first occasion again, that ~Ir.
Hoffn1an cmne, on the 19th of :May, you say
he cmne in the afternoon as I understood you~

A. Yes.
Q. And who started the fire, who started the
s1noldering of the sawdust~
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A.

I think it was Mr. Hoffman.

Q. Did Mr. Hoffman come back that night, did
he leave and then come back to check up on
this smoking1
A.

At this first time he came back before I
closed my shop and again told us to be very
careful and have it cold smoke. And he told
me to touch the wurst, the wurst must be
cool.

Q.

Did he tell you anything to do in the event
it was not.

A.

Only he told me to spray water on the sawdust.''

Mrs. Suhrmann confirmed this testimony ( 354, 355).
Hoffman's assistance in this smoking was in line
with the understanding that Suhrmann had with N oorda
and which understanding is reflected by the following
testimony elicited by defendants' counsel from Suhrmann
on cross examination (331):

"Q. Now, I want to know what was said about
the arrangements made in connection with
this smoking by you and what 1\ir. N oorda
said about it.
A.

The agreement was this : That the meat company would deliver the sausage made except
the process of smoking, deliver it in my business and I would smoke it for them and the
company had to pay.
THE REPORTER: I can't hear you.

A.

The agreement was this, the company would
deliver in my business a quantity of mett-
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wurst ready made up to the process of smoking and I should do the smoking in my oven
for and on behalf of the company and I would
accept the price that the company make to
me."
In further confirmation of the fact that this work
of Hoffman's was in line with the agreement between
N oorda and Suhrmann was the testimony that some of
the mettwurst smoked by Suhrmann was to be returned
to the Jordan Meat. Suhrmann testified (315,316):

"Q. I want you to direct your attention to a conversation that you had about smoking more
mettwurst than you would use, did you have
only one such conversation¥
A.

No, It happened several times.

Q. When was the first time as nearly as you
can put it¥
A.

He has no recollection -

Q.

Was it before or after, or on the 19th of :May?

A.

After May 19th.

Q.

Can you remember where the first conversation took place 1

A.

I can't remember it, but my wife surely will
remember.

Q.

Do you remeinber the conversation you had 1

A.

Yes sir.

ask my wife.

Q. Will you tell what was said 1
MR. BAYLE: Just a moment, 'Ye would like
to know the ti1ne of this conversation. He says he
doesn't know but his wife knows about it, and I
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assume his wife is the one that talked to the
party we are now speaking of.
THE COURT: I think he said he then pursued it and he said it was after May 19th, that
is the closest he could put it. I don't know whether
you have asked whether anyone else was present,
Mr. Roberts, I think he is entitled to have that.

Q.

(By Mr. Roberts). Was anybody else present
besides you and Mr. Suhrmann ~

A.

Several times Mr. N oorda was present when
I talked to Mr. Hoffman.

Q. Was Mr. N oorda at one or more of these
conversations that was had about smoking
more mettwurst in your oven than you would
use~

A.

Except that this was a conversation over
the phone, he was present.

Q. Were each of these conversations on this
subject about the same?
A.

Everytime that he was expected to smoke
more than he really needed for himself, they
advised him beforehand and asked for permission.

Q. By "they" who do you mean?
A.

The firm, Jordan Meat and Livestock Company.

Q. Who was there, what individual, would you
talk to all individuals?
A.

To Mr. Hoffman.

Q.

Now, will you tell us what was said?
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A.

Naturally after more than two years I cannot
recollect every word which was spoken, but
the essence is this: The gentlemen would tell
me we have so and so, so much additional
wurst to smoke and we will bring it over
to your establishment and you will be kind
enough to smoke it, call us by phone and we
will pick it up, and each one, or two of these
people would come to the factory and you
can bring it back to us."

And, as a rna tter of fact, mettwurst was returned on
a number of occasions to defendants and invoices were
made out showing credit for these returns (318). Also,
invoices were introduced showing the sale of this mettwurst hy Jordan Meat to customers Brinksma and Lingman (Exhibits P-15 and P-19). We submit that the foregoing testimony supports the finding that Hoffman was
acting as the agent of defendants in assisting and advising Suhrmann in the smoking of the mettwurst sausage. Suhrmann did not know how to smoke n1ettwurst.
In order to sell this meat product it was essential that
he be instructed in the details of this work. In furtherance of that objective Hoffman showed him how to perform this process. N oorda denied that Hoffn1an had
anything to do with the selling end of the business. The
evidence, however, is to the contrary. It establishes
without question that Hoffman was engaged in taking
orders from Suhr1nann and making deliveries of nlettwurst to Suhrn1ann. He participated in the discussions
concerning 1nettwurst delivered to Suhrmann on and
after May 19th and his activities in overseeing the s1nok-
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ing was in line with the understanding between Suhrmann and Noorda.
In Schneider v. Suhrmann, (not yet reported) the
evidence on this question was substantially the same and
this Court stated that evidence on this question was
eompleting this holding in effect that this evidence would
support a finding of Hoffman's agency.
2. Defendants knew, or shou,ld have known, Suhrmann would not process mettwurst to kill trichina.

The supported finding that Hoffman was the agent
of defendants in assisting and advising Suhrmann in
smoking the mettwurst establishes the defendants' knowledge that Suhrmann did not intend to process the mettwurst for the purpose of killing trichina. It is established that there are three methods of killing trichina.
One is by freezing, another by heating to a temperature
of 137° F., and the third, a salt curing method (503). The
latter two methods were not even considered by defendants or Hoffman and Hoffman participated in the cold
smoking of this mettwurst and by that he meant a temperature in the vicinity of goo F. (537-53g). He told
Suhrmann that the temperature could be a little 1nore
than goo, but that if it would go higher, to say 90, it
would spoil and ruin the mettwurst ( 30g). This type
of smoking would not raise the temperature high enough
io kill trichina. This being the only processing Suhrmann was to do, the defendants, through their agent
Hoffman, knew that Suhrmann would not process the
mettwurst to kill trichina.
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Even without this agency of Hoffman the evidence
would establish that defendants knew, or should have
known, that Suhrmann would not process the mettwurst
to kill trichina. According to N oorda, one of the reasons
the defendants discontinued smoking mettwurst for Suhrmann was that they did not desire to cool their ovens
down to the point necessary to kill trichina.
' POINT II.
A SPECIAL VERDICT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO GIVE THE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS OF EITHER PLAINTIFFS OR DEFENDANTS.

If the court below had submitted the case to the
jury on a general verdict, then it would have been necessary to give the instructions requested by the parties.
However, the court concluded to submit the matter on a
special verdict wherein the jury resolved the issues
of fact. After the jury had returned its verdict making
these findings, the court then applied the law to the
·facts so found and rendered a judgment. in favor of
plaintiffs and against the defendants.
The jury found that plaintiffs contracted trichinosis
from eating trichina infested mettwurst bought frmn
·the defendant Suhrmann, who in turn purchased it from
the other defendants who in turn had manufactured
the mettwurst. The jury further found that the defendants through their agent Hoffn1an assisted Suhrmann in
the smoking of the mettwurst. The jury also found that
the defendants knew that Suhrmann did not intend to
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do anything to the mettwurst which would kill trichina.
With these facts before it, the court of necessity returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.
Defendants refer to seven requested instructions
which they claim were error not to give. Defendants do
not discuss these instructions separately and it should
be obvious that any discussion on their part could only
lead to the result that the court properly rejected these
instructions in view of the fact that it submitted the
case on a special verdict.
Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 9 states that
if the plaintiffs' contracted trichinosis due to circumstances beyond the control of the defendants or as a
result of the negligent acts of others, such as Suhrmann,
then the verdict must be against plaintiffs.
This instruction is erroneous in two particulars.
First, there is no evidence to support any finding that
there were circumstances beyond the control of the defendant Valley Sausage, and second, the negligence of
Suhrmann would not be the sole cause of the damage
to plaintiffs and could not be an intervening cause, because, as found by the jury, the defendants knew that
he was going to smoke the mettwurst without doing
anything that would kill trichina. The jury found that
plaintiffs' trichinosis was not due to circumstances beyond defendants' control.
By requested instruction No. 2, defendants sought
to have the court advise the jury of the statutes of the
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State of Utah and then to instruct the jury that if it found
plaintiffs purchased the sausage from defendant Suhrmann and did not expressly or by implication make
known to the defendant Valley Sausage that the mettwurst was to be eaten in a raw, uncooked or unprocessed
condition, they should find in favor of the defendant
Valley Sausage. Everyone knew that mettwurst would
not be cooked by the consumer. It is a product which
is ready for consumption upon sale. The jury found that
Valley Sausage knew that Suhrmann would not process
the mettwurst to kill trichina. Hence, defendant Valley
Sausage knew that nothing would be done to kill trichina
and therefore, so far as this mettwurst was concerned,
it was ready for human consumption. Nothing was to be
done to eliminate trichina. Under the findings of the
jury defendant Valley Sausage warranted that the mettwurst was fit for consumption because it was then, except
for smoking, in condition to be eaten. This requested
instruction is clearly inapplicable here.
Defendants' requested instruction No. 13 was properly refused for the reason that it is a mandatory "no
cause of action" instruction and only considers the plaintiffs' right to recover on the grounds of negligence. It
is not necessary to establish negligence in a warranty
case. The jury found the Inett\nust was infested with
trichina. This would constitute a violation of Section
40-20-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and would be negligence per se. Skerl v. lr'illolr Creek Co,al Company, 92
Utah 47+, 69 P. 2d 502; Tr'ilcox v. Trunderlicll, 73 rtah
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1, 272 P. 207. Hence, this instruction was inapplicable.
See Troi'eto v. G. H. Hammond Co., 110 F. 2d 135;
Leonardi v. Habermann Provisi'on Co., 143 Ohio St. 623,
56 N.E. 2d 232; Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 ~font. 63,
181 Pac. 326.
The need to give defendants' requested instruction
#14 was eliminated by the finding of the jury that the
defendant assisted in smoking the mettwurst through
their agent Hoffman and by the finding that defendants
knew there would be no further processing by Suhrmann
to kill trichina.
Defendants' requested instruction #20 was covered
by the finding that the defendants knew Suhrmann would
not process to kill trichina. Everyone admitted that the
mettwurst would be eaten by the consumer without
cooking it. This is not like the sale of pork chops or a
pork roast. In that situation, a person would expect the
meat would be properly cooked. Here, the mettwurst
was a spread which was not to be cooked or further
processed by the consumer.
Defendant's requested instructions #22 and #25 are
not applicable. They ignore the situation present in the
case at bar. Defendants prepared the mettwurst knowing
no further steps would be taken to eliminate trichina.
It was only to be smoked and so far as the trichina
was concerned it was in exactly the same condition as
it would be when sold to the consumer. The facts found
by the jury rendered these two instructions inapplicable.
None of plaintiff's requested instructions on the
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so-called theory of the case was given to the jury. The
reason is obvious. The court submitted the facts to the
jury and the court applied the law. The authorities submitted by the defendants are not in point.

Defendants' authorities are not helpful.
In Chili v. Cudahy Brothers Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255
N.W. 414, plaintiff sought to recover both on negligence
and breach of warranty. He was not permitted to recover
on either. He did not prove negligence and the court held
there was no implied warranty that pork is fit for human
consumption in a raw state. The plaintiff purchased 30
pounds of fresh pork butts at defendant's retail store.
Great stress was laid on the fact that defendant did
not know that the pork was to be used in making raw
sausage. It is uncontradicted in the case at bar that the
mettwurst would be eaten by the consumer without cooking it. Defendants knew that no steps had been taken
to eliminate trichina and they knew that nothing
further would be done after the product left their hands
to eliminate trichina. Their agent assisted in the smoking.
This case widely differs from the Chili case where the
pork sold was such that it would be cooked before eating,
while here it would be eaten in the condition it was in
when delivered by the retailer. Defendants knew what
this condition would be.
Defendants refer to the case of Dressler v. Merkel,
Inc., 284 N.Y. Supp. 697 (affinned on appeal, -1 N.E. 2d
744) as being directly in point. Here again defendants
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are stretching things considerably. In that case the defendant was a wholesale dealer in pork products. It sold
pork shoulders and back fat to one Ehring who operated
a butcher shop. He in turn made this into mettwurst,
which was smoked but not cooked. There was no finding in that case or any suggestion that defendant knew
what was to be done with the pork products it sold to
the retailer. In the case at bar, we have the situation
where defendants made th~ Inettwurst up to the point
of smoking. Everything was done by them except that
process in getting this product ready for human consumption. Defendants participated and supervised thi~
last step through their agent Hoffman. Smoking only
changes the flavor and these defendants knew that so far
as elimination of trichina was concerned the mettwurst
was ready for human consumption.
In Eisenbach v. Gimbel Brothers, 281 N.Y. 474, 24
N.E. 2d 131, plaintiff ate pork tenderloin at defendant's
restaurant. The suit was against the defendant restaurant and it impleaded its vendor, a wholesaler. This wholesaler impleaded its vendor, a packer. The verdict was
against the defendant and the court instructed that if
the verdict was against the defendant restaurant, then
the defendant restaurant and its vendor were in turn
entitled to judgments in their favor. The jury found that
the chef at the restaurant had improperly cooked the
pork. The case at bar is entirely different because there
was to be no cooking of this mettwurst. There is no question here of improper cooking. The basis of the court's
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holding that the defendant restaurant was not entitled
to judgment was that such recovery would not be permitted upon the principle that a party cannot recover
for a loss that he could have averted by reasonable care.
·In the case at bar defendants knew that Suhrmann
would not cook the mettwurst and hence failure to cook
would not be an intervening cause. Also in that case the
one defendant was precluded from recovery because of
its own contributory negligence and here plaintiffs seek
judgment against all defendants and contributory negligence of one defendant will not bar judgment against
him or the other defendants so far as plaintiff is concerned.
Defendants say that since an inspection for trichina
or a test for their presence is unknown, failure to make
the same is not negligence. There never has been any
claim by plaintiffs that this was the negligence relied
upon. The sale of trichina infested pork constituted a
violation of the Utah Statutes and is hence negligence
per se without more. Also, a warranty is hereby involved
which again necessitates no negligence.
Defendants contend that the warranty to be implied
is a warranty that the food will be fit for human consumption when processed or used in the customary
and proper manner. We have no quarrel with tllis rule.
In the first place, the mettwurst was to be eaten "ithout further cooking. No one could anticipate that Inettwurst would be cooked. The important thing is that defendants when they prepared and sold this 1nettwurst
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knew that it must then be fit for human consumption
with the exception of smoking. They warranted that it
was in such condition.
vVhere a special verdict is submitted to a jury, it
is not customary for the trial court to instruct the jury
as though a general verdict would be returned. It may
well be that had a general verdict been submitted, instructions something like those requested by defendants
would have to be given, but here the facts were found
by the jury and the law was applied by the court thus
eliminating the necessity of an explanation to the jury
of the law.
We believe the court followed both the language
and the spirit of Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
in submitting this case to the jury. If counsel had desired
any further issues submitted to the jury, it was encumbant upon him to frame such and request it. He made no
such request. Rule 49 in such event provides as follows:

"* * * If in so doing the court omits any
issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the
evidence, each party waives his right to a trial
by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the
jury retires he demands its submission to the
jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand
the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do
so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment on the special verdict."
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
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The basis of defendant's argument under this point
is that there was no evidence that any act or omission
to act by defendants proximately caused plaintiffs to
contract trichinosis. This in turn is based upon the proposition that the negligence of Suhrmann was an intervening act which was the sole cause of plaintiffs' illness.
The findings of the jury completely refute this
argument. Defendants placed in the channels of commerce mettwurst containing trichina, knowing that Suhrmann would do nothing to kill same and knowing the
consumer would not cook the product. Also their agent
participated in and supervised the smoking process performed by Suhrmann. Under this latter situation if Suhrmann was negligent so were defendants through their
agent and the act of their agent could not be an intervening cause.
The conduct of Suhrmann in not processing the
mettwurst to kill trichina was foreseeable. The jury
found that defendants knew Suhrmann would not so
process it. Under the law this prevented such conduct
from being an intervening cause. In Prosser on Torts
(2nd Ed.) 268, the rule is stated as follows:
"If the intervening cause is one which in
ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason
to anticipate under the particular circumstances,
he may be negligent because he has failed to
guard against it . . .
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved
from liability by the fact that the risk, or part
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of the risk, to which he has subjected the plaintiff has come to pass. Foreseeable intervening
forces are within the scope of the original risk,
and hence of the defendant's negligence. The
courts are quite generally agreed that such intervening causes will not supercede his responsibility."
The act of defendants in placing the trichina infested
mettwurst in channels of commerce did not come to rest
until eaten by plaintiffs. The affect of that act was a
continuing one. The act of defendants and Suhrmann
concurred to cause the illness of plaintiffs.
As stated in Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138
· P. 2d 639 (1943).
"The conduct of Babcock and Ehalt - and
the latter when he assumed Babcock's position
by the understanding between them also assumed
his duties if in fact he did not have an independent duty to watch the gauge - in neglecting
to attend to the water in the boiler was simply
a continuation of the conduct of the predecessor
crew. It was an added and continued negligence
of the same type and not an independent nor an
intervening cause. The whole conduct of predecessor and successor crews was of a piece. An
independent intervening agent such as to break
the causal connection between right and wrong
according to Bohlen on ·Torts, page 29, must be
(1) independent, self created, not itself the product of the wrongful act; (2) it must intervene;
(3) "It must divert and not merely hasten natural
effect of the wrong."
This Court then quoted Judge Sanborn in Union
Pac. R. Co. v. Callagan, 56 Fed. 988 as follows:
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"The independent intervening cause that will
prevent a recovery on account of the act or ornission of a wrongdoer must be a cause which interrupts the natural sequence of events, turns aside
their course, prevents the natural and probable
result of the original act or omission, and produces a different result, that could not have been
reasonably anticipated. The concurrent or succeeding negligence of a fellow servant or a third
person which does not break the sequence of
events is not such a cause, and constitutes no
defense for the original wrongdoer, although, in
the absence of the concurrent or succeeding negligence, the accident would not have happened."
Jordan v. Coca Cola Co., 117 Ut. 578, 218 P. 2d 660
(1950) is not remotely analagous to the case at bar.
That case involved drinking from a bottle of Coca .Cola
containing flies and other impurities. Plaintiff obtained
the bottle from an automatic dispensing machine. He
relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which is
not involved in the case at bar. The court refused to
apply this doctrine because the cap of the bottle could
be removed and replaced without detection and it was
not shown there had been no opportunity to do so. In
fact, the court held, it was shown there were numerous
opportunities to tamper with the bottle.

Under the foregoing authorities we submit the conduct of Suhrmann was neither the sole proximate cause
of plaintiff's illness nor an intervening cause. Defendants' act was a proximate cause of that illness.
Under the facts of the case plaintiffs were entitled
to recover upon the ground defendants violated Sections
4-:20-5 and S, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Do·naldson v.
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Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E.
213, 128 .A.L.R. 456; annotations 128 .A.L.R. 464 and 28
A.L.R. 1384; Troietto v. G. H. Hammond Co., 110 F. 2d
135; Leonardi v. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio St.
623, 56 N.E. 2d 232; Kelly v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont.
63, 181 Pac. 326.
.Also plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the
ground of breach warranty. Walters v. United Grocery
Co., 51 Utah 565, 172 Pac. 473; Decker & Sons v. Capps,
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828, 142 .A.L.R. 1479; Weideman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210; McSpedin v.
Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E. 2d 513, 105 A.L.R. 1497;
Greco v. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E. 2d 557, 115
A.L.R. 1020; Charles v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. 2d
199; Swengil v. F & E Wholesale Grocery, 147 Kan. 555,
77 P. 2d 930.
POINT IV.
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE CROSS-COMPLAINT OF SUHRMANN AND SUBMITTING THE ISSUES THEREIN TO THE JURY IN NO
WAY AFFECTS THE JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFFS
AGAINST DEFENDANTS.

The issues of this case were presented to the jury
on interrogatories contained in a special verdict. Certain
of the interrogatories related to the issues between plaintiffs and defendants, others related to the issues between
defendant Jordan Meat, defendant Valley Sausage on
one side and defendant Suhrmann on the other.
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To have submitted these latter issues could not have
been error, prejudicial or otherwise. The defendants do
not point out in what particular there was any prejudice
to them. No confusion could have resulted because the
interrogatories are clear, simple and concise. They separate the issues between the various parties.
Defendants cite the answer to Interrogatory No.
9 as showing confusion. The jury could have found, and
did, that while defendant Suhrrnann did lose business
there was no satisfactory proof as to the amount.
We submit that permitting the jury to answer questions concerning the rights of Suhrrnann could not possibly affect the answers made to the interrogatories
relating to the rights of plaintiffs.

·-·

CONCLUSION
The jury found all issues in favor of plaintiffs.
~Those findings are supported by the evidence and the
findings in turn support the judgment. The verdict accomplishes justice between the parties and the judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RA \VLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS
& BLACK, CANNON & DUFFIN

Counsel for Respondents
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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